Abstract. We first examine Howard's analysis of the Bell factorizability condition in terms of 'separability' and 'locality' and then consider his claims that the violations of Bell's inequality by the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics should be interpreted in terms of 'non-separability' rather than 'non-locality' and that 'non-separability' implies the failure of space-time as a principle of individuation for quantum-mechanical systems. And I find his arguments for both claims to be lacking.
Mechanics
Abstract. We first examine Howard's analysis of the Bell factorizability condition in terms of 'separability' and 'locality' and then consider his claims that the violations of Bell's inequality by the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics should be interpreted in terms of 'non-separability' rather than 'non-locality' and that 'non-separability' implies the failure of space-time as a principle of individuation for quantum-mechanical systems. And I find his arguments for both claims to be lacking.
Introduction
Don Howard has claimed that Bell's theorem and its (meta-)physical implications can be fruitfully understood by way of the 'Separation Principle' found in Einstein's own incompleteness argument (Howard 1985; cf. Einstein 1948) . Howard gives an interpretive analysis of the 'Separation Principle' in terms of two logically independent, conceptually distinct principles he calls 'separability' and 'locality' and shows that the Bell factorizability condition is itself a consequence of these two principles (Howard 1989 and 1992) . On this basis he argues that the violations of the Bell inequalities by the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics and the confirmation of those predictions in experiment can (and should) be interpreted as exhibiting 'non-separability' rather than 'non-locality'. And such 'non-separability', he claims, implies the failure of space-time itself as a principle of individuation for quantum-mechanical systems generally. In the following I will develop and criticize his arguments for each of these claims and find his conclusions less than compelling.
Analysis of the Bell Factorizability Condition
We begin with Howard's notions of 'separability' and 'locality'. Howard states the 'separability principle' "asserts that any two spatially separated systems possess their own separate real states", while the 'locality principle' "asserts that all physical effects are propagated with finite subluminal velocities, so that no effects can be communicated between systems separated by a space-like interval" (Howard 1985, 173) . Regarding the 'separability principle' in particular, which will be of primary importance to our discussion, Howard states that it asserts that the contents of any two regions of space-time separated by a nonvanishing spatio-temporal interval constitute separable physical systems, in the sense that [(i)] each possesses its own, distinct physical state, and [(ii) ] the joint state is wholly determined by these separate states. In other words, the separability principle asserts that the presence of a non-vanishing spatio-temporal interval is a sufficient condition for the individuation of physical systems and their associated states.... (Howard 1989, 225-6) For this principle to be applicable, some interpretation of 'state' is required. Howard defines the 'state' p λ (x | m) λ of a physical system S primarily in terms of a (marginal) conditional probability measure for possible outcomes x of measurements on S given measurement context m , p λ (x | m) (Howard 1989, 226, n. 2; cf. 1992, 310) . According to this definition, the quantum state of a physical system would represent a definite property of the system if and only if p λ (x | m) = 1 , that is, if and only if λ is an eigenstate and x is the corresponding eigenvalue of the observable X , which is precisely the orthodox 'Eigenstate-Eigenvalue Rule'. Now, beginning with Jarrett's analysis of the Bell factorizability condition into two distinct independence conditions, outcome independence and parameter independence, Howard aims to show that the factorizability condition is also equivalent to the conjunction of what he calls the 'separability condition', which he claims follows from his separability principle, and the 'locality condition', which he claims follows from his locality principle (Howard 1989 (Howard , 1992 . Let A ( B ) be the respective outcome for an EPR-Bell type correlation experiment on S 1 ( S 2 ), a ( b ) be the respective apparatus setting, and λ the joint state of the composite system. Then the Jarrett (1984) analysis of the factorizability condition,
yields the sets of following sets of conditions -outcome and parameter independence, respectively:
and
Howard's analysis of the factorizability condition (1) begins by making the following identifications:
Now, given these identifications (4), Howard's 'locality condition' is just the statement of parameter independence (3) with λ 12 , λ 1 and λ 2 replacing λ where appropriate -
Howard claims that (5) follows from his locality principle, and this claim appears unproblematic (but we will return to it below). So, his analysis requires further only that the outcome independence condition (2) be shown to be equivalent to his 'separability condition', which he defines as follows:
Two physical systems S 1 and S 2 are 'separable' if there exist 'separate' states λ 1 and λ 2 for S 1 and S 2 , respectively, such that
where λ 12 represents the (complete) joint state of the system S 12 composed of S 1 and S 2 .
Howard claims also that this separability condition (6) follows from his separability principle, and given his definition of 'state' this claim is unobjectionable.
Howard's argument to show that (2) and (6) are equivalent runs as follows. First, to show that (6) implies (2), we apply (6) and (4) successively to the following definition of conditional probability:
Thus, (6) implies (2). To show that (2) implies (6), we again begin with the definition of conditional probability, but instead apply successively (2) and (4):
Thus, (2) implies (6). Therefore, the argument concludes, (2) and (6) are equivalent and, hence, outcome independence is equivalent to the separability condition.
Although the mathematics here is surely correct, one may question whether
Howard's argument constitutes strict proof that the outcome independence condition (2) and the separability condition (6) are equivalent. Crucial to the argument is the identifications (4), the assumption of which Howard himself does not justify. Now, the argument establishes the equivalence of (2) and (6) only if (4) is independent of both (2) and (6) and, moreover, only if (4) is as unquestionable here as the definition of conditional probability. Regarding the first point, note that the very statement of the identifications (4) implicitly assumes that there are already separate states λ 1 and λ 2 for the spatially separated systems S 1 and S 2 , respectively, and, hence, takes for granted (at least) clause (i) of the separability principle which postulates the existence of such states. Thus, neither the identifications (4) nor the locality condition (5), the statement of which assumes (4), are fully independent of the separability principle. Howard does recognize this dependence of the locality condition (5) upon clause (i) of the separability principle (Howard 1989, 227) , but fails to see the same dependence regarding the identifications (4), the latter of which being relevant here. The question now arises whether the identifications (4) is independent of clause (ii) of the separability principle, which is crucial for the statement of the separability condition (6). B| a,b) assumes effectively that the marginal outcome probabilities for S 1 and S 2 are independent of conditionalizing upon the states of S 2 and S 1 , respectively. Given Howard's definition of the 'state' of a system in terms of a marginal conditional outcome-probability measure, this amounts to the assumption that the respective states of S 1 and S 2 are each independent of the states of the other system, which is just what the separability condition (6) asserts. Thus, (4) is not independent of (6). So, while assuming the identifications (4) when showing that the separability condition (6) implies the outcome independence condition (2) remains unproblematic, making the same assumption when showing the converse threatens circularity. It appears, then, that the most Howard can prove here is that the separability condition (6) implies the outcome independence condition (2), not that the two conditions are equivalent. However, that is in fact all that is actually required to derive implications for the separability principle from violations of the Bell inequality and, hence, the failure of the Bell factorizability condition (1). For if one gives up the outcome independence condition (2) rather than the parameter independence condition (3), as Howard argues we should, then one must still also give up the separability condition (6), which would consequently imply that the separability principle itself fails in some respect. We'll return to this below. Laudisa (1995) has also called into question Howard's argument that the separability condition (6) is equivalent to the outcome independence condition (2). He also focuses on the identifications (4), but criticizes them on somewhat different grounds.
He claims that the identifications (4) are implausible, for they implicitly conflate two distinct notions of 'state' -namely, the notions of 'value state' and 'dynamical state' -which are generally distinguished within the 'modal' interpretation. While the value state of a physical system is specified by which observables for the system have a definite value at a given time and what those definite values are, the dynamical state is specified by how the system evolves over time, where the prediction of measurement outcome probabilities belongs primarily to the dynamical state. In the context of quantum mechanics, the dynamical state just is the quantum state, while the value state is assigned on the basis of some property rule; and in the orthodox interpretation, which (4), the separability condition (6) is not equivalent to the outcome independence condition (2) (Laudisa 1995, 318) .
One could further develop this criticism as follows. The separability principle, inasmuch as it concerns the space-time individuation of systems, should be characterized generally in terms of value, rather than dynamical, states (i.e., in terms of definite properties rather than probabilities). But, in order to maintain the equivalence of the separability condition (6) and the outcome independence condition (2), the separability condition must be defined in terms of dynamical states. Thus, whereas separate states in the separability principle would refer to the value states of the spatially separated systems S 1 and S 2 , the separability condition (6) would refer to the dynamical states λ 1 and λ 2 of S 1 and S 2 , respectively; and, because separate (i.e., distinct) value states does not necessarily imply separate dynamical states (in the sense of the separability condition), the inference from the separability principle to the separability condition would be rendered non sequitur, for the latter could fail (with respect to dynamical states) while the former holds (with respect to value states).
The above criticism is valid given a general value/dynamical state distinction. Such a distinction, of course, is foreign to Howard's orthodox interpretation of 'state'. This makes it clear, then, that Howard's claims that the separability principle implies the separability condition and that the separability condition (6) is equivalent to the outcome independence condition (2) are specific to an orthodox interpretation of 'state' and thus need not hold generally. This point will be of importance when assessing the implications of giving up the separability condition.
Locality versus Separability
Leaving aside such objections until the next section, we turn next to assessing
Howard's claim that we must (or, at least, should) give up the separability condition (4) in the face of violations of the Bell inequality by the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics. His claim rests upon the argument that violation of the locality condition (5) is incompatible with both the special theory of relativity and reasonable methodological constraints on theory construction and confirmation. We will consider these arguments in turn.
Howard's argument that violation of the locality condition is incompatible with the special theory of relativity begins with the claim only that the separability condition is suspect regarding violation of the Bell inequality, for violation of the locality condition "threatens" special-relativistic locality constraints because it "could" be used to signal super-luminally, which raises a question of only a possible incompatibility between violations of locality and the special theory of relativity. But, in the summary of the argument, his characterization of the modality of such incompatibility suddenly changes.
Whereas before his claim was only that violations of the locality condition present a possible violation of special-relativistic locality constraints, Howard now claims that violations of the former imply violations of the latter; he thus concludes that the only possible way to explain the violation of the Bell inequality by the statistical predictions of quantum mechanics in a way that is compatible with the special theory of relativity is to deny the separability condition (Howard 1992, 306-7, 312-13) .
Crucial to this sudden shift of modality in Howard's argument is the claim that violation of the locality condition implies violation of 'special relativistic locality constraints'. Regarding what such locality constraints entail, Howard uses this phrase throughout the argument to refer consistently to "constraints on superluminal signaling" (Howard 1992, 306 (Shimony 1984) . Therefore, Howard's claim notwithstanding, the locality condition does not simply "embody" special-relativistic constraints on super-luminal signaling; it is a stronger assumption than is needed to rule out super-luminal signaling (i.e., noncontrollability will do). So, his conclusion here is simply non sequitur.
This also opens up an objection to his claim that the locality condition follows from the locality principle, the latter of which explicitly prohibits super-luminal signaling.
Because violations of the locality condition do not necessarily permit signaling at all and, hence, do not necessarily imply failure of the locality principle, one could well argue that the locality principle does not by itself imply the locality condition. Something more -a Principle of Common Cause, say -is still needed. Combined with the objection concerning the connection between the separability principle and separability condition made in the previous section, this would undercut completely Howard's initial claim, namely, that the Bell factorizability condition is a consequence his separability and locality principles; for although the factorizability condition does follow from the locality and separability conditions (5) and (6), respectively (given the identifications (4)), there appears to be no necessary connection of each respective condition to its associated principle.
Again leaving this objection aside, the second argument that Howard marshals in favor of giving up the separability condition rather than the locality condition is that abandoning the locality principle (as a consequence of giving up the locality condition)
would be methodologically unreasonable. Here he offers glosses on Einstein's remarks concerning the relation of separability and locality to the formulation and testing of theories (cf. Einstein 1948) . The separability principle is necessary to the formulating of physical theory because, if separability were to fail so that we could not individuate systems spatio-temporally, then the only system to which theoretical state-descriptions could refer unambiguously would be the entire universe itself. And the locality principle is necessary to the testing of physical theory because, if locality were to fail so that we could not screen off distant influences, we could not be sure of the reliability of measurement results (Howard 1989, 245-6) . Where I disagree with Howard concerning the methodological role of separability and locality in formulating and testing theories is primarily in regard to which should be privileged in this respect when a choice between them is forced.
Howard privileges the locality principle over the separability principle, and for this he appeals to Einstein's own distinction between 'principle' and 'constructive' theories (Einstein 1919) : principle theories provide high-level empirical-regulative principles which, though neither a priori certain nor uniquely determined by the phenomena, serve as himself considered the special theory of relativity to be a principle theory and thus took the 'special principle of relativity' to be one of those high-level empirical-regulative principles;
and, while Einstein himself never makes any characterization of his own 'Separation
Principle' in such categories, Howard places the separability principle in the constructive class. Howard then argues:
Like Einstein, I believe that ultimate understanding is provided only by a constructive theory; but, also like Einstein, I believe that any particular constructive hypothesis should bow to the authority of regulative principles that, like the locality principle, enjoy considerable empirical substantiation. And so I would argue that the locality principle ought to be given the benefit of the doubt. The burden of proof should fall on those who prefer nonlocality to nonseparability. (Howard 1989, 247) While appeal to authority and proof by default is no argument, we will challenge this claim. But separability has all the marks of an empirical-regulative principle of theory construction; for it does not make any prescription for filling in the content a specific physical model of a certain phenomenon, but rather asserts a generic constraint on all physical models that would employ a space-time representation to comprehend any phenomenon. In this respect separability plays a role in theory construction similar to that think one has here two empirical-regulative principles and not, as Howard suggests, one empirical-regulative and one constructive principle, in which case one must make a further argument for privileging one over the other.
Taking both separability and locality as empirical-regulative principles, one should ask to begin with whether they are equally necessary to the formulation and testing of physical theory. First, consider locality; is it, as both Einstein and Howard (1989, 246) agree, an absolutely necessary condition of the possibility of testing physical theory?
Assume that it is, that if locality failed and the world were in fact 'non-local', then any physical theory would be untestable in principle. And suppose that Bohmian mechanics is, in fact, true; because Bohmian mechanics is 'non-local' in the sense that it fails to satisfy the locality condition, this would effectively be to assume that the world itself is non-local in that sense. But, if the world were non-local, then Bohmian mechanics would not be testable, strictly speaking. Now, Bohmian mechanics is empirically equivalent to standard quantum mechanics in that it makes all the same statistical predictions as standard quantum mechanics; and insofar as such statistical predictions are in fact well-confirmed experimentally, they are so with respect to both standard quantum mechanics and such is the case in general or in particular. And I take the evident in-practice testability of
Bohmian mechanics to strongly suggest, if not imply, that the claim of the in-principle
non-testability of non-local physical theories is simply incorrect.
Let us suppose, though, that Einstein and Howard are correct in claiming that locality is a strictly necessary condition of the possibility of testing physical theories. Is locality then distinguished from separability in this respect such that locality is privileged over separability? Einstein himself did not think so. For in that regard he made a claim for separability similar to that he made for locality: "Neither does one see [if separability were
to fail] how physical laws could be formulated and tested without such clean separation [of spatially distant physical systems]" (Einstein 1948, 321, my translation) . But Howard, while acknowledging that "some scheme for individuating systems is necessary in order to formulate and test scientific theories", goes on to diverge from Einstein's (supposed) view that the separability principle is itself necessary. And the reason he gives for disagreeing with Einstein's view here is not unlike the one we have just given for disagreeing with both
Einstein and Howard regarding the necessity of locality for testing physical theory:
Agreeing with [Einstein] on this last point would entail one's declaring the quantum theory, which violates the separability principle, to be, in effect, a fundamentally incoherent theory.... But this is a step I do not feel compelled to take. (Howard 1989, 246) So, separability and locality do appear after all to be on equal footing with regard to the formulation and testing of physical theories.
Where, then, does this leave us regarding the relative methodological status of the separability and locality principles? Privileging either principle over the other is ultimately a matter of theory selection, one decided by normative criteria, not by logic or experiment.
That is, to privilege one principle over the other is effectively to choose one theory over another, a theory which satisfies that principle but not the other. Einstein himself made a comparison of constructive and principle theories according to their respective virtues:
"The advantages of the constructive theory are completeness, adaptability, and clearness, those of the principle theory are logical perfection and security of the foundations." (Einstein 1919 ). This suggests that in his view -if strict adherence to both a wellestablished empirical-regulative principle and a currently-accepted constructive hypothesis precludes the construction of a coherent and adequate model or 'picture' (and, hence, understanding) of certain phenomena -one can be warranted in either privileging a wellestablished empirical-regulative principle over a given constructive principle, or vice-versa;
and that would cohere with his view that all theoretical scientific concepts and principles (including both constructive and empirical-regulative principles) are ultimately conventional and so always revisable and provisional (Einstein 1933 and 1936) .
Of course, which choice is appropriate in any given context would depend upon one's relative evaluation of the respective virtues or advantages of the available options for theory modification, considered with respect to both the empirical evidence and the aims of physical theory (e.g., causal-explanatory understanding). In the present case, to privilege locality over separability, as Howard claims we should, would be to choose, say, standard quantum mechanics over Bohmian mechanics, which are equally well-supported by the available empirical evidence; and the ultimate reason for doing so would lie not in the individual merits of locality relative to separability, but rather in the appraisal of standard quantum mechanics relative to Bohmian mechanics with respect to certain normative criteria of theory selection. Indeed, Howard reveals himself on this point by remarking that the potential fertility of giving up the separability principle is chief among the reasons for his preference (Howard 1989, 232) .
Non-Separability and the Space-Time Individuation of Quantum-Mechanical Systems
Finally, let us now suppose along with Howard that it is indeed the separability condition (6), rather than the locality condition (5) We begin by noting that the denial of the separability principle presents (at least) a two-fold ambiguity. First is the non-separability of states -either there are no separate (i.e., distinct) states for spatio-temporally separated systems or the joint state of spatiotemporally separated systems is not completely determined by their separate states; second is the non-separability of systems -spatio-temporal separation is not a sufficient condition for individuating systems. Now, regarding the implication of the violation of the separability condition for the separability principle, it is clear that violation of the separability condition implies the non-separability of states (given, of course, Howard's definition of 'state'). Whether it implies further the non-separability of systems is not clear, and Howard defers this question by way of a footnote, but never answers it directly. He does, though, express his view that the non-separability of systems is also implied by the violation of the separability condition, both by his promotion of an ontology of nonseparable systems and, in particular, by the following remark: "We confront here a radical physical holism at odds with our classical intuitions about the individuation of systems and states..." (Howard 1989, 228, emphasis added) . In any case, whether that is his express view or not, it is this question that is at stake here. For violation of the Bell factorizability condition, assuming the locality condition is not violated, implies the impossibility of the space-time individuation of quantum-mechanical systems only if the non-separability of systems is implied by the violation of the separability condition.
First, note that the non-separability of states, which is implied by the violation of the separability condition, itself presents a further two-fold ambiguity; for one could deny exist, or at least are possible, then the space-time individuation of such systems in terms of those states also remains possible. Therefore, because the violation of the separability condition does not necessarily imply the non-existence of separate or distinct states for spatially separated systems (i.e., non-separability of states in the first sense), the violation of the separability condition by itself does not necessarily (i.e., independently of a given interpretation) imply the non-separability of systems and, a fortiori, does not necessarily imply the impossibility of the space-time individuation of quantum-mechanical systems.
Again, though, let us deny a general value/dynamical state distinction and, hence, grant that separate or distinct states for spatially separated systems would not exist if the separability condition were violated. Does such an assumption imply the non-separability of systems and, hence, the impossibility of the space-time individuation of quantummechanical systems? The answer, I think, is still 'no'. For what has been assumed here is at most the non-existence of separate or distinct quantum states for spatially separated systems, which is surely the case for 'entangled' systems (e.g., pairs of spin-1/2 particles prepared in a singlet state). To take the non-separability of states (in both senses) to imply the non-separability of systems is to assume that composite quantum-mechanical systems can be 'separable' only with respect to their joint quantum state. So, the conclusion that Bell's theorem implies, via the violation of the separability condition, the impossibility of the space-time individuation of quantum-mechanical systems requires, over and above granting methodological privilege to the locality principle over the separability principle, that one assume further both that spatially separated systems having a non-separable joint dynamical or quantum state fail to possess separate or distinct value states for quantum-mechanical observables (or that such value states do not exist in general) and that the quantum state-description is complete in principle. Thus, the conclusion does not hold generally, but rather is peculiar to an orthodox interpretation.
From the point of view of the Bell factorizability condition under Howard's analysis, then, the space-time individuation of quantum-mechanical systems remains an open possibility for any viable interpretation that denies (at least) one of these three claims.
